At Davos in January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney compared the state of the international rules-based order to Czechoslovakia’s communism in the 1970s. In other words, it was just a series of slogans that had long lost their meaning. Carney said the world’s “lesser” countries need to recognize this reality to avoid returning to a world where, as Thucydides put it, “the strong do all they can and the weak suffer.”
This call is especially urgent for Estonia, a small country with a long history of participating as a pawn in the geopolitical games of great powers. The latest issue is vikerkar We look behind the empty slogans and ask what remains of the liberal international order and how small states can survive and prosper in a potential replacement.
hypocrisy of international order
Estonians recall that the Soviet Union regularly intervened in national affairs it considered to be in its “sphere of interest”, such as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But what is less well known in these parts of the world is that the United States has done similar things in its “near abroad,” from Guatemala (1954) and Brazil (1964) to Chile (1973) and Nicaragua. (1980s).
But the fact that the liberal rules-based order has always contained some degree of hypocrisy does not mean it was just fiction, writes international relations scholar Tina Pajuste. “Even if rules are broken, it is usually not simply by publicly condemning the rules of international relations, but by reinterpreting or restating them.…From this perspective, the rules-based order cannot be seen as a failure.”
Recalling the gross violations of international law during George W. Bush’s presidency, Karl Lemvit Rahne argues that Donald Trump’s presidency has revealed an embarrassing truth: “The selective application of international law seems to be plaguing most politicians in the West, including Estonia, but only now that we ourselves have become its next potential victim.”
Rahne argues that bowing to great power politics and openly aligning with either player is a bad idea. Especially since none of the big players have shown themselves to be reliable partners. Instead, he supports Mr Carney’s proposal to empower the European Union as a bloc that prioritizes democracy and international law.
However, the EU is far from playing such a role. Laane’s answer is federal. Only this path, he argues, will allow the EU to evolve into an entity politically, technologically and militarily powerful enough to counter illiberal alliances.
A small state in a big game
Mart Krudkepp asks what lessons Greenland’s history holds for the world’s small countries like Estonia. Greenland’s decolonization drive and Estonia’s departure from colonial rule in 1918 reveal the importance of addressing the harsh realities underlying idealistic slogans. This means that self-determination needs to be carried out in practice through expertise, capacity, and often military force.
“Even if Greenland achieves full independence, issues such as economic sustainability, administrative capacity, transportation infrastructure, energy, budgeting, security, and relations with Denmark and the United States will still need to be resolved. Greenland’s move toward greater autonomy is emerging not just as a constitutional issue, but as a political challenge. The outcome will show whether the right to self-determination can be institutionalized and made permanent in highly asymmetrical conditions.”
Given Greenland’s dependence on subsidies from Copenhagen (approximately SEK 4.5 billion), the effects of climate change, and the discovery of new natural resource deposits, the question of autonomy involves the question: “What parts of Greenland’s customary way of life can be preserved in this process, and what must be replaced by others?”
Many other major powers also have plans for the region, and Greenland will have to navigate the area diplomatically with the administrative capacity of a small European town (the island has a population of about 56,000). Like Estonia’s past, Greenland’s present is a reminder that liberal values and democratic aspirations must be based on real resources and power.
Trump’s madness has no means.
Jan Werner Müller sketches connections and comparisons between Donald Trump’s brand of far-right populism and versions more common in Europe, particularly in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán was just voted out of office. It is clear that the Trump administration tried to copy Orbán’s strategy, but it was only partially successful, Muller told editor Aro Vermette.
“Overall, I think we’re seeing a pretty similar pattern. If anything, I think what’s different is that right now the U.S. still seems to lack the talent to do things in a very systematic way. Back in 2010 and 2011, Orbán said he was going to create a new state system – and I can’t say it was completely successful, but there were a lot of resources available in terms of experienced administrators and people with their own ambitions. But it still took a long time for them to figure out how to turn universities into foundations, for example, with the aim of capturing them and subordinating them.”
Review by Aro Vermet
Source: Eurozine – www.eurozine.com
