Over the past few weeks, Israel has marked its 20th anniversary since the “liberation of Gaza.” The 2005 operation was to root out 8,500 settlers and pull out the army. Presented as a way to ease Israel’s military burden and redraw its borders, the move circumvented Palestinian authority and left Israel to control Gaza’s borders, airspace and resources. However, overseas, withdrawal was seen as a bold step towards a solution to two states. Javier Solana, then head of foreign policy for the EU, said: The EU, along with fellow quartets, the US, Russia and the United Nations, left the centre of roadmap diplomacy, effectively supporting then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral unilateralism as progress.
Gaza, February 2025. Author: Jaber Jehad Badwan/Source: Wikimedia Commons
Disengagement’s false promise
But 20 years later, the promises celebrated overseas became sour at home. Israeli television marked the anniversary with dramas and documentaries that cast evacuation as national trauma, urging viewers to sadden the settlers’ families and watch the attacks on October 7th as an inevitable outcome. But what omitted such commemorations was the political logic of the time, sought a deadlock rather than a solution.
Certainly, the movement itself was a strategic misdirection that disguised peacebuilding. By working on evacuation of four isolated front-post bases on the West Bank of Northern Jordan River, Sharon was able to argue that it was not “Gaza alone” even if he used the gesture as a shield against adoption of diplomatic pressure. After dropping out of the territory that was held responsible, he gave him political space to strengthen his grip on Israel’s West Bank. As his confidant dov weisglass admitted, the plan was intended to pour “formaldehyde” into the peace process.
The Palestinians quickly realized that Israeli officials had openly admitted. Gaza was dumped as a token of flexibility, even as the expansion of settlements in the West Bank accelerated. Israel still controls Gaza’s sky, seas and borders. And with devastating effects, they rejected all the bags of cement needed to rebuild their homes, schools and infrastructure after each wave of destruction.
Disillusionment from the one-sided exit was not confined to Gaza. Israel’s retreat from southern Lebanon in 2000 had already shown how the risk of withdrawal without an agreement bringing Israel back with greater force. Fear caused war in 2006 when the abduction of two Hezbollah soldiers caused by war, thousands of rockets fell to Israel, ground campaigns shaking, and state investigations broke down the government for unclear purposes. The lessons drawn by many Israelis were dull. Further withdrawals from the West Bank were off the table.
For Palestinians, lessons were the opposite. It is possible that extremists, not negotiations, will force change. Israel withdrew without consulting Mahmoud Abbas or Palestinian authority, suggesting that diplomacy had brought nothing while Hamas rockets forced concessions. If violence only left when the profession was unacceptable, extremists rather than negotiations appeared to be the lever of shock.
That belief helped Hamas win the January 2006 election and seize control a year later. In response, Israel and Egypt imposed a lockdown. The factory was rusty, but Gaza University graduates discovered that their degrees were useless beyond the fence. The votes seemed futile while tunnels and rockets brought results for generations raised without opportunity. For the Hawks in Jerusalem, all rockets justified the siege. For Gaza militants, all new restrictions have confirmed that registration is only enforced.
However, the siege was not carried out by Israel alone. Instead, it quickly became stronger in international policy. The US and Europe reduced direct aid to Hamas-led authorities and limited their involvement to humanitarian relief. The EU’s civil border support mission in Rafa, launched in 2005, was suspended in 2007.
Even if Gaza was sealed, the West Bank had been reworked. The separation barrier crept into the far east of the 1949 truce (“Green Line”) and surrounded the reconciliation block. By 2020, the Trump administration’s “peace to prosperity” blueprint simply codified what expansion had already been established on earth.
Cycle of siege and war
The siege was separated by wars from 2008 to 2009, 2012, 2014, 2018 and 2022. Each was framed as an “operation” aimed at restoring deterrence. The planner called it “mowing the grass,” treating extremists as repetitive work rather than predictable outcomes of statelessness. This rhythm stuck to the doctrine. Each round left Gaza weakly, but never quiet. By 2023, Hamas’ attacks had not burst any further than the highest point.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas militants broke Gaza borders, attacked communities in southern Israel, killing around 1,200 people and taking 250 hostages. Israel vowed to “destroy Hamas.” After nearly two years of artillery fire and intrusion, Gaza is in abandoned. The vast area has been reduced to tile rubs, with most of the population being evacuated, and Palestinians have died more than 60,000. Critics call it collective punishment, war crimes, calculated star. The vast majority of experts claim Israel’s actions in Gaza are equivalent to genocide: A moral catastrophe that reminds us of Europe once pledged to never allow it again. Ironically, Israel has now allowed a full military takeover of Gaza – framed as temporary – exactly 20 years after it declared it “leave” the strip.
Liberation failed because, at least in Palestinian terms, it was not designed to be successful. A genuine withdrawal would have shifted sovereignty along with responsibility. Instead, Israel held the lever of control, waiving its Gaza welfare obligations. One-sidedism destroyed reciprocity, weakened moderates and empowered extremists. The siege produced resistance and proved unjustified security was hollow, not submission. On October 7th, neither the wall nor the surveillance technology could eliminate proximity or resilience.
Outside actors helped to entrench the deadlock. Washington and Brussels, once proficient in diplomacy in the two states, have reduced it to a humanitarian crisis to manage Gaza, but it is not a political conflict that should be resolved. We will suspend evacuation negotiations and support evacuated political will. By accepting Israel’s self-justification, outsiders have come to believe that conflict could be segregated.
The temptation to substitute responsibility has now returned with a new European diplomatic choreography.
Recognize without escaping
As Gaza burns, Europe once again reaches for policy gestures. France has said it will formally recognize Palestine at the UN General Assembly in September, when the UK, Australia, Malta and Belgium joined. In parallel, France and Saudi Arabia co-chaired the high-level UN conference that produced the “Declaration of New York.” But for now, much of this momentum remains declarative.
Timing crystallizes tragedy. Just 20 years after Sharon’s “breeding”, as Israeli operations continue in Gaza, the European capital is preparing to recognize the Palestinian state. The lack of recognition, lack of escape, and risk of danger are mere rituals in the shadow of desolation, the same logic that one has ever retreated without sovereignty due to the stability of the siege. Symmetry is unmistakable. If Israel once retracted settlers while maintaining control, Europe is now offering recognition while acknowledging control.
If approval is more than theatre, it must come as a recognition plus. Enforceable restrictions related to settlement growth. Transfer of borders, airspace and resources to Palestinian sovereignty. Strong support for institutional renewal of Palestine under unified and legitimate leadership.
The departure was intended as a rest. Instead, it deepened despair. Twenty years later, the warning is clear. A simply managed crisis ultimately manages us. Europe, once defending the two states’ solution, cannot afford to stand aside. Recognition, by itself, does not arrest drift. Importantly, it must be fixed not on the theatre but on a concrete staircase that provides sovereignty and reciprocity. Otherwise, Europe will rehearse two liberation. First, Israeli name, then by its own name.
Source: Eurozine – www.eurozine.com
